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1 Introduction
Strategy-proofness is a demanding condition that most mechanisms will fail to satisfy, unless
they are dened on properly restricted environments. Group strategy-proofness is a more
stringent requirement, but also a much more attractive one. Indeed, what use would it be to
guarantee that no single individual could cheat, if a handful of them could jointly manipulate
the system? Yet, the literature on mechanism design has concentrated mostly in analyzing
the weakest of these two conditions: after all, it is hard enough to meet, and often impossible
except for trivial procedures.
We are now well beyond the disquieting negative message of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite
theorem (Gibbard, 1973 and Satterthwaite, 1975). After years of research, we know of a
considerable number of instances where non-trivial mechanisms can be found to be strategy-
proof when dened on some domains of interest. They include the case of voting when
preferences are single-peaked or separable, or when the outcomes are lotteries; they also
include families of cost sharing, matching and allocation procedures, again for the case where
the preferences of agents are conveniently restricted. When looking at the rich literature on
strategy-proof rules over restricted domains, one discovers, somewhat surprisingly, that some
of the non-trivial strategy-proof mechanisms that arise in these environments are, indeed, also
group strategy-proof! It is as if, after a hard search for a solution to the challenge of strategy-
proofness, the additional blessing of group strategy-proofness would arise automatically, as
an extra gift. Of course, this does not happen in all cases, but it occurs often enough as to
warrant the following question. When is it that, once a strategy-proof social choice function
is dened, it is necessarily also group strategy-proof? More specically, what are the domains
of preferences under which these two conditions collapse into one and the same requirement?
We provide a rather complete solution to that question in voting models, by providing
conditions on families of preference proles such that any strategy-proof social choice function
whose domain is one of these families will also be necessarily group strategy-proof. Of course,
there could exist rules dened on domains that do not meet our conditions, that are still
strategy-proof but not group strategy-proof.
How restrictive are our conditions, and what ground do we cover? In some special situa-
tions group strategy-proofness follows from individual strategy-proofness without any further
restrictions. These include the cases where there are only two or three social alternatives
and the trivial domains where only one agent has more than one possible preferences.
For general cases, we provide essentially two conditions for domains to imply the equiva-
lence between our two incentive compatibility requirements. The rst one, called sequential
inclusion, is satised by very classical domains, including the set of all preferences that are
single-peaked (or single-dipped), for a given order of the alternatives. It is important to
remark that sequential inclusion is a condition that applies to each preference prole indi-
vidually, rather than a requirement on the family of proles that are included in a domain.
Because of that, subsets of proles satisfying sequential inclusion do also meet the condition.
This allows our results to hold not only for su¢ ciently large sets of proles, but also for all of
their subsets. Notice that, as we shrink a given domain to a smaller one, containing only part
of the original proles, new rules may start satisfying the requirement of strategy-proofness.
Our condition guarantees that these emerging rules will also be group strategy-proof.
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Our second condition holds for larger domains where not all individual proles satisfy
sequential inclusion, but where an indirect version of this condition holds. One of these is
the universal domain, but we have other examples. Again this condition is proven to be
su¢ cient for the equivalence between group and individual strategy-proofness, but it is no
longer the case that the result applies to all subdomains.
Filling the gap between individual and group strategy-proofness is important, because
it would be hard to avoid manipulations if groups of agents could distort the rules to their
advantage, even if no single individual was able to. For this same reason, it is also interesting
to examine those cases where groups could only manipulate if they were large enough. In
these second best worlds, one could still hope that coordination costs and other restrictions
might avoid actual manipulation. In Section 5 we discuss an adaptation of our conditions
guaranteeing that, when strategy-proof rules exist on given domains, they are also immune
to manipulations by groups smaller than a given size.
Similarly, we know that on any given domain of preferences, individual and group
strategy-proofness can be obtained at the cost of reducing the range of social choices to
only include two alternatives. And we also prove in this paper that both conditions become
equivalent if we restrict the range of any function to only have three elements. In Section 6
we discuss how our conditions may guide the choice of larger but still restricted ranges for
social choice functions, in order to maintain this equivalence.
The importance of considering deviations by coalitions, and not only by individuals was
already remarked in the early literature on strategy-proofness and implementation. See,
for example, the early works of Pattanaik (1978), the seminal contributions of Green and
La¤ont (1979) and of Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin (1979, especially section 4.5) or the
short note by Barberà (1979). All of these papers refer to the characteristics of functions
which may be immune to manipulation by coalitions. They either explore conditions for this
property to hold in some cases, or they exhibit by means of examples the di¢ culties involved
in their design.
The question we address is related, but di¤erent. We investigate conditions on domains
of preferences under which individual and group strategy-proofness become equivalent. This
new approach is a natural consequence of the many remarks by di¤erent authors on the
coincidence between the two conditions in di¤erent settings (Barberà and Jackson, 1995,
Moulin, 1999 and Pápai, 2000; see also Peleg, 1998 and Peleg and Sudholter, 1999 for the
connections with the related concept of coalition-proofness). A systematic analysis of this
question has only one antecedent we know of, a recent paper by Le Breton and Zaporozhets
(2008) where they prove the equivalence in the case of rich domains. Our results cover several
domains that are rich but also many others that do not satisfy this requirement.1 This will
become apparent in the text. In addition, we also study the connection between strategy-
proofness and vulnerability to manipulation by small groups of individuals, a phenomenon
whose importance has been remarked by several authors (Pattanaik, 1978, Barberà, 1979,
1Richness is a property that appears under di¤erent versions in many papers since Dasgupta, Hammond,
and Maskin used it extensively in their 1979 paper. Its spirit is to guarantee that domains contain "enough"
preferences, connected in appropriate ways, as to be able to establish links between several proles in the
domain. It is an "interprole" condition. Our main conditions (sequential inclusion and k-size sequential
inclusion) can be dened in reference to only one prole at a time: they are "intraprole" conditions.
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Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou, 1991, and Serizawa, 2006). To our knowledge, these
connections had never been explored systematically in the terms that we use here.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the model, the denition of our
basic condition of sequential inclusion and the proof that, in domains where this condition
is satised, individual and group strategy-proofness become equivalent. Section 3 provides
examples of domains that satisfy sequential inclusion. Section 4 introduces the weaker con-
dition of indirect sequential inclusion, and proves it to still be su¢ cient to guarantee the
equivalence of our two incentive compatibility requirements. Examples of domains where
this new condition holds are also provided. In Section 5 we analyze a natural weakening
of group strategy-proofness, one that precludes manipulation by "small enough" groups of
agents. We then prove that the newly dened notion of k-group strategy-proofness is equiv-
alent to individual strategy-proofness under a convenient weakening of the original notion
of sequential inclusion. Section 6 considers the possibility of attaining equivalence by re-
stricting the range of our social choice functions. Section 7 provides a partial result on the
necessity of sequential inclusion to achieve equivalence. Specically, we can prove that, if
the condition is violated by some domain of preferences, there are subdomains of the initial
one where some strategy-proof rules are no longer group strategy-proof. Section 8 concludes
with some directions for further work. Finally, an Appendix collects some proofs.
2 The model and the basic result
Let A be the set of alternatives and N = f1; 2; :::; ng be the set of agents (with n > 2). Let
capital letters S; T  N denote subsets of agents while lower case letters s; t denote their
cardinality.
Let R be the set of complete, reexive, and transitive orderings on A and Ri  R
be the set of admissible preferences for agent i 2 N . A preference prole, denoted by
RN = (R1; ::; Rn); is an element of i2NRi. Preferences will be denoted in two possible
ways. When they are part of a given preference prole, well use the notation Ri 2 Ri to
denote that these are the preferences of agent i in the prole. In other cases, we want to
have a name for a given preference, and our notation must be independent of who holds the
preference in question at what prole. Then we will use superscripts, and let Rl stand for
a specic relation. We may later on attribute that preference to some agents, and then we
will write that Rl = Ri or equivalently, Rli.
2 As usual, we denote by Pi and Ii the strict
and the indi¤erence part of Ri, respectively. Let C; S  N be two coalitions such that
C  S. We will write the subprole RS = (RC ; RSnC) 2 i2SRi when we want to stress
the role of coalition C in S. Then the subproles RC 2 i2CRi and RSnC 2 i2SnCRi
denote the preferences of agents in C and in SnC, respectively. In the case, where we denote
full preference prole (that is, when S = N), we simplify notation by using (RC ; RNnC) as
(RC ; R C).
The following concept is crucial in all our analysis. For any x 2 A and Ri 2 Ri, dene
the lower contour set of Ri at x as L(Ri; x) = fy 2 A : xRiyg : Similarly, the strict lower
contour set at x is L(Ri; x) = fy 2 A : xPiyg.
2The latter notation will be used extensively in the Appendix, proof of Theorem 4.
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A social choice function (or a rule) is a function f : i2NRi ! A. Let Af denote the
range of the social choice function f .
We will focus on rules that are nonmanipulable, either by a single agent or by a coalition
of agents. We rst dene what we mean by a manipulation and then we introduce the well
known concepts of strategy-proofness and group strategy-proofness.
Denition 1 A social choice function f is group manipulable on i2NRi at RN 2 i2NRi
if there exists a coalition C  N and R0C 2 i2CRi (R0i 6= Ri for any i 2 C) such that
f(R0C ; R C)Pif(RN) for all i 2 C. We say that f is individually manipulable if there exists
a possible manipulation where coalition C is a singleton.
Denition 2 A social choice function f is group strategy-proof on i2NRi if f is not group
manipulable for any RN 2 i2NRi. Similarly, f is strategy-proof if it is not individually
manipulable.
The reader will notice that our denition requires that all agents in a coalition that
manipulates should obtain a strictly positive benet from doing so. We consider this re-
quirement compelling, since it leaves no doubt regarding the incentives for each member of
the coalition to participate in a collective deviation from truthful revelation.
Notice that the domains of our social choice functions will always have the form of a
cartesian product. This is necessary to give meaning to our denitions of individual and
group strategy-proofness. Also notice that, although the notion of a domain is attached to
that of a given function, we shall also refer to any cartesian family of preference proles as
a domain, and to its cartesian subsets as its subdomains. This is consistent with tradition,
although it would be more precise to call them potential domains, as we shall in fact consider
sets of functions that could be dened on them.
We shall not dwell on the importance of achieving either of these two incentive compatibil-
ity conditions. Let us just insist, as we already did in the introduction, that even the weakest
one of individually strategy-proofness is hard to meet, but that both have been shown to be
achievable under a variety of domain restrictions. Our focus will be on these specic cases
where it is possible to at least dene satisfactory strategy-proof rules. What is needed then
to hope for the stronger and much more reassuring property of group strategy-proofness to
also hold? This is the main question we address.
Specically, in this section we dene our rst condition on preference proles, called
sequential inclusion, and we establish the equivalence between individual and group strategy-
proofness for social choice functions dened on domains satisfying that condition. Before
that, let us introduce some notation that will be important and will often appear along the
paper.
LetRN 2 i2NRi; and y; z be a pair of alternatives. Denote by S(RN ; y; z)  fi 2 N : yPizg ;
that is, the set of agents who strictly prefer y to z according to their individual preferences
in RN .
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Denition 3 Given a preference prole RN 2 i2NRi and a pair of alternatives y; z 2 A;
we dene a binary relation % (RN ; y; z) on S(RN ; y; z) as follows:3
i % (RN ; y; z)j if L(Ri; z)  L(Rj; y).
Note that the binary relation % must be reexive but not necessarily complete. As usual,
we can dene the strict and the indi¤erence binary relations associated to %. Formally, i  j
if L(Ri; z)  L(Rj; y) and L(Rj; z)  L(Ri; y): We say that i  j if L(Ri; z)  L(Rj; y) and
:[L(Rj; z)  L(Ri; y)]:
We now suggest an interpretation of the relation in terms that will be useful for the
proof of our main result. As we shall see, our reasoning will involve orderings of individuals,
and the binary relation we just dened will be closely connected to the possibility or the
impossibility of constructing such orderings. Here is how we should interpret it. If i % j,
well say that i may precede j. If i  j, then well say that i must precede j.
We can now dene our main condition.
Denition 4 A preference prole RN 2 i2NRi satises sequential inclusion for y; z 2 A
if the binary relation % (RN ; y; z) on S(RN ; y; z) is complete and acyclic.
Denition 5 A preference prole RN 2 i2NRi satises sequential inclusion if for any pair
y; z 2 A the binary relation % (RN ; y; z) on S(RN ; y; z) is complete and acyclic. A domain
i2NRi satises sequential inclusion if any preference prole in this domain satises it.
Since sequential inclusion is a property on preference proles, it follows that if a domain
satises sequential inclusion each subdomain inherits the same property. This is interesting
to note: our condition does not require domains to be large in the size contrary with other
conditions, like that of "richness" (see Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin, 1979, Le Breton
and Zaporozhets, 2008).
To illustrate sequential inclusion consider the following examples.
Example 1 Let N = f1; 2g, A = fx; y; z; wg; and R1;R2  fR;R0; eRg; where xPyPzPw,
xP 0yP 0wP 0z; and w ePy ePz ePx as represented in the following table4:
R R0 eR
x x w
y y y
z w z
w z x
:
Let RN= (R;R0) and take y; z 2 A. By denition, S(RN ; y; z) = f1; 2g: Observe also that
L(R; z)  L(R0; y) and L(R0; z)  L(R; y), that is, 1  (RN ; y; z)2. Thus, % (RN ; y; z) is
complete (trivially acyclic since there are only two agents). The same argument works for
3In what follows, and when this does not induce to error, we may omit the arguments RN , y and z and
just write %.
4From now on, we will use in some examples the same table representation for individual preferences.
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any pair of alternatives and thus we can conclude that RN satises sequential inclusion.
Let RN= (R; eR) and take y; z 2 A. By denition, S(RN ; y; z) = f1; 2g: Observe that neither
L(R; z)  L( eR; y) nor L( eR; z)  L(R; y) holds. Then % (RN ; y; z) is not complete which
means that RN violates sequential inclusion.
Example 2 Let N = f1; 2; 3g, A = fx; y; z; w; tg; and R1;R2  fR;R0; bRg such that the
binary relations stated in the following table hold:
R R0 bR
x w t
y y y
w t x
z z z
t x w
:
Let RN= (R;R0; bR), y; z: S(RN ; y; z) = f1; 2; 3g: Observe that L(R; z)  L(R0; y) but
: L(R0; z)  L(R; y), then 1  2. Similarly, 2  3 and 3  1. Thus, % (RN ; y; z) is
complete but it has a cycle: RN violates sequential inclusion.
Remark 1 Notice that there are two distinct ways to violate sequential inclusion: by lack
of completeness and because of cycles. Both aspects of the denition are essential in what
follows, but could be factored out for other purposes, as their implications are di¤erent.5
We can now present our main result.
Theorem 1 Let i2NRi be a domain satisfying sequential inclusion. Then, any strategy-
proof social choice function on i2NRi is group strategy-proof.
Proof. We will use the following fact several times: for any reexive, complete and acyclic
binary relation T on a nite set B, the set C(B; T ) = fx 2 B : xTy for any y 2 Bg of best
elements of T on B is non-empty.
Let f be a strategy-proof social choice function on i2NRi satisfying sequential inclusion.
By contradiction, suppose that f is manipulable by some coalition C  N: That is, there
exists a coalition C, RN 2 i2NRi, and eRC 2 i2CRi, such that for any agent i 2 C,
f( eRC ; R C)Pif(RN). Let y = f( eRC ; R C) and z = f(RN). Note that C  S(RN ; y; z).
Now we will go from RN to ( eRC ; R C) by steps, replacing each time the preference of one
agent in C. The order in C will be determined by sequential inclusion.
By sequential inclusion, % (RN ; y; z) is complete and acyclic on S(RN ; y; z), thus, complete
and acyclic on C. Choose an agent in C(C;% (RN ; y; z)), without loss of generality, say it
is agent 1. Thus, L(R1; z)  L(Rh; y) for h 2 Cnf1g: Change preferences of agent 1 and
let z1 = f( eR1; R f1g). By strategy-proofness, z1 2 L(R1; z) and thus z1 2 L(Rh; y) for any
h 2 Cnf1g: Observe that S(( eR1; R f1g); y; z1)  Cnf1g.
5We use this factorization in the proof of Theorem 4 sketched in Section 7.
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By sequential inclusion, % (RN ; y; z1) is complete and acyclic on S(RN ; y; z1), thus, complete
and acyclic on Cnf1g. Choose an agent in C(Cnf1g;% (RN ; y; z1)), without loss of gener-
ality, say it is agent 2. Thus, L(R2; z1)  L(Rh; y) for h 2 Cnf1; 2g: Change preferences
of agent 2 and let z2 = f( eRf1;2g; R f1;2g). By strategy-proofness, z2 2 L(R2; z1) and thus
z2 2 L(Rh; y) for any h 2 Cnf1; 2g: Observe that S(( eRf1;2g; R f1;2g); y; z2)  Cnf1; 2g.
Repeat the same argument changing from Ri to eRi the preferences of all agents in C. Sup-
pose that we have repeated this process c   2 times, that is, without loss of generality, we
have changed preferences of agent c  2:
By sequential inclusion, % (RN ; y; zc 2) is complete and acyclic on S(RN ; y; zc 2), thus, com-
plete and acyclic on Cnf1; :::; c 2g. Choose an agent in C(Cnf1; :::; c 2g;% (RN ; y; zc 2)),
without loss of generality, say it is agent c   1. Thus, L(Rc 1; zc 2)  L(Rh; y) for h 2
Cnf1; :::; c 1g  c: Change preferences of agent c 1 and let zc 1 = f( eRf1;:::;c 1g; R f1;:::;c 1g).
By strategy-proofness, zc 1 2 L(Rc 1; zc 2) and thus zc 1 2 L(Rc; y):
Finally, change preferences of agent c and let zc = f( eRC ; R C). Note that zc = y. By
strategy-proofness, zc = y 2 L(Rc; zc 1) which is the desired contradiction.
3 Examples and special cases
We provide here some examples of domains in which sequential inclusion holds and of others
where it does not.
3.1 Examples
Single-peaked preferences
Single-peakedness arises as a natural restriction on the preferences of agents facing many
relevant problems: determining the level of a pure public good without transfers, locating a
facility on a line, deciding on a tax level, choosing among candidates, among others.
Denition 6 A preference prole RN is single-peaked i¤ there exists a linear order > of the
set of alternatives such that
(1) Each of the voterspreferences has a unique maximal element pi(A), called the peak of
i, and
(2) For all i 2 N , for all pi(A), and for all y; z 2 A
[z < y 6 pi(A) or z > y > pi(A)]! yPiz.
Proposition 1 Any single-peaked prole RN satises sequential inclusion.
Proof. Take any single-peaked prole RN and any pair of alternatives y; z 2 A such that,
without loss of generality, y < z: Let us show that % (RN ; y; z) on S(RN ; y; z) is complete
and acyclic. Remark that for any pair of agents i; j such that yPiz and yPjz, then, either
L(Ri; z)  L(Rj; z) or L(Rj; z)  L(Ri; z). To see this, notice that both lower contour sets
are unions of two sets (the set containing alternatives to the right side of z and the set of
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alternatives to the left side of y). One of the two sets (the one to the right side of z) is
common to all individual preferences. The other sets are specic to each z and they are
necessarily contained in each other.
By this remark, agents in S(RN ; y; z) can always be ordered according to the increasing
order of lower contour sets at z. Without loss of generality, say L(R1; z)  :::  L(Rs; z).
Since yPiz for any i 2 S(RN ; y; z), 1 % 2; 3; :::; s; 2 % 3; :::; s; ...; and s  1 % s: This shows
that % (RN ; y; z) is complete and acyclic (there is no cycle since any agent may precede any
other following him given the order stated by the increasing order of lower contour sets at
z).
In Figure 1 below, we depict three preferences of a single-peaked prole corresponding to
agents who prefer y to z and where A is a closed interval in the real line. The picture may
help with the general argument in the proof.
y z
[ ]
R3
R1
L(R3,z)
[ ]
L(R1,z)
R2
[
L(R2,z)
[
]
]
] [ ]
[]
Figure 1. Illustration that any single-peaked preference prole satises sequential inclusion.
Single-dipped preferences
We consider now the domain of single dipped preferences. They allow us to analyze cases
where distance to a reference "worse" point is preferred, as it is the case when one must
allocate a public bad. This is in contrast with the opposite motivation of single peaked
preferences, where being closer to the reference "best" point is preferred.
Denition 7 A preference prole RN is single-dipped i¤ there exists a linear order > of the
set of alternatives such that
(1) Each of the voterspreferences has a unique minimal element di(A), called the dip of i,
and
(2) For all i 2 N , for all di(A), and for all y; z 2 A
[z < y 6 di(A) or z > y > di(A)]! zPiy.
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Proposition 2 Any single-dipped prole RN satises sequential inclusion.
Proof. Take any single-dipped prole RN and any pair of alternatives y; z 2 A such that,
without loss of generality, y < z: Let us show that % (RN ; y; z) on S(RN ; y; z) is complete
and acyclic. We can always consider a partition of S(RN ; y; z) = S1(RN ; y; z) [ S2(RN ; y; z)
such that S1(RN ; y; z) = fi 2 S(RN ; y; z) such that di(A)  zg and S2((RN ; y; z)) = fi 2
S(RN ; y; z) such that di(A) > zg. Note that agents in S1(RN ; y; z) are such that L(Ri; z) 
L(Rl; y) for any i; l 2 S1(RN ; y; z). Thus, for any i; l 2 S1(RN ; y; z), i  (RN ; y; z)l. Ob-
serve also that for any pair of agents i; j 2 S2(RN ; y; z), then either L(Ri; z)  L(Rj; z)
or L(Rj; z)  L(Ri; z). To see this, notice that the lower contour sets of agents with dip
above z are specic to each z and they are necessarily contained in each other. Thus,
we can always order agents in S2(RN ; y; z) according to the increasing order of lower con-
tour sets at z. Without loss of generality, say L(Rs1+1; z)  :::  L(Rs1+s2 ; z). Thus,
s1 + 1 % s1 + 2; :::; s1 + s2; s1 + 2 % s1 + 3; :::; s1 + s2; ...; and s2   1 % s2: Finally, observe
that L(Ri; z)  L(Rj; y) for any i 2 S1(RN ; y; z) and j 2 S2(RN ; y; z) (since y < z and
dj(A) > z for all j 2 S2(RN ; y; z)). Thus, i % (RN ; y; z)j for any i 2 S1(RN ; y; z) and
j 2 S2(RN ; y; z): This shows that % (RN ; y; z) is complete and acyclic (rst note that any
possible cycle should contain agents in S2 since agents in S1 are all indi¤erent. However,
among agents in S2 there is no cycle given the order stated by the increasing order of lower
contour sets at z).
In Figure 2 below, we depict four preferences of a single-dipped prole corresponding to
agents who prefer y to z and where A is a closed interval in the real line. The example may
help with the general argument in the proof.
y z
R1
R4
L(R1,z) L(R3,z)
R2
L(R2,z)
R3
L(R4,z)
L(R1,y) L(R3,y)L(R2,y) L(R4,y)
Figure 2. Illustration that any single-dipped preference prole satises sequential inclusion.
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Separable preferences and its subdomains
The domain of separable preferences, which we describe below, provides an example of a
domain admitting strategy-proof rules that are not group strategy-proof. Yet, we will also
dene a subdomain of these preferences where the equivalence still holds.
Alternatives are vectors of length k, with a zero or a one in each component. They can
be interpreted in a variety of manners. They can stand for a characteristic function describ-
ing subsets of a basic set of k alternatives. They can also be understood as representing
collections of decisions on whether or not to accept each of k independent projects. They
can also be interpreted as descriptions of alternatives that may or may not have some of k
characteristics, each one associated with one of the dimensions.
Separability is a restriction on the class of linear orders on the family of vectors in f0; 1gk:
Let v denote a generic vector in f0; 1gk, and vl be its l component for any l = 1; :::; k. Given
any linear order P on that set, let B(P ) denote the set of unit vectors (vectors with only a
1) that are worse than the zero vector, according to P; and let G(P ) denote the set of unit
vectors that are better than the zero vector. Denote by 1h the unit vector with a one in
dimension h, and by V 0h (respectively, V
1
h ) the set of vectors that have a zero (respectively,
a 1) in component h: Then, P is separable if, for all h, and any v 2 V 0h ;
(v + 1h)Pv if 1h 2 G(P ), and
vP (v + 1h) if 1h 2 B(P ).
Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991) have characterized the family of social choice func-
tions on the domain Sk of separable preferences on f0; 1gk that are strategy-proof.
An example of these rules, which are in addition neutral and anonymous, is given by
quota rules. When society consists of n agents, a quota is a number between 0 an n. Then,
given the preferences of the agents, the rule with quota q chooses a vector that has a 1 in
position h if 1h belongs to at least q of the sets G(Pi) of agents i 2 N , and has a 0 in position
h, otherwise.
Consider the case k = 2; n = 2; q = 1: The following preferences are separable.
P1 P2
(1; 0) (0; 1)
(0; 0) (0; 0)
(1; 1) (1; 1)
(0; 1) (1; 0)
Under the quota 1 rule, the outcome is (1; 1); and no individual can manipulate. Yet, both
agents would prefer (0; 0); and they can obtain this result if they both declare (0; 0) to
be their best alternative: Observe that this preference prole does not satisfy sequential
inclusion.
This example extends to larger k0s; n0s and di¤erent q0s: It not only proves that one
can have strategy-proof rules that are not group strategy-proof on that domain, but it also
suggests that the rules may be extremely fragile, as they can be manipulated by groups
composed of two agents alone. We return to that subject in Section 5.
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We now provide a new example of a domain where all strategy-proof rules are group
strategy-proof: the class of separable preferences on f0; 1gk with a common lexicographic
order (k) on the dimensions. This domain, that we denote by L(k)k , is dened as follows.
Preferences are still separable. In addition, there is an ordering (k) of the dimensions
(without loss of generality, we take it to be the natural order 1; :::; n) such that preferences
satisfy the following condition:
vPv0 if 9h 2 N such that vl = v0l for l < h; and
v 2 V 0h ; v0 2 V 1h , and 1h 2 B(P ), or else v 2 V 1h ; v0 2 V 0h , and 1h 2 G(P ).
We provide an argument to show that for the case k = 2, any prole of preferences
that are separable and lexicographic relative to a common order of the dimensions satises
sequential inclusion. Our argument runs as follows. Fix the order 1<2 on both dimensions.
Note that the domain of all individual preferences L1<22 is the following:
P P 0 P 00 P 000
(0; 0) (1; 0) (0; 1) (1; 1)
(0; 1) (1; 1) (0; 0) (1; 0)
(1; 0) (0; 0) (1; 1) (0; 1)
(1; 1) (0; 1) (1; 0) (0; 0)
Observe that for any pair of alternatives y; z 2 A there only exist two preferences in L1<22
such that yPz: Thus, for any preference proleRN , S(RN ; y; z) will always consist of, at most,
two agents. Consider the following example where y = (0; 0); z = (0; 1); and take RN such
that it contains agents of the two di¤erent types, say 1 and 2; with R1 = P 0 and R2 = P .
Without loss of generality, there is one agent of each type, that is, S(RN ; y; z) = f1; 2g:
Remark that L(R1; z) = f(0; 1)g  L(R2; z) = f(0; 1); (1; 0); (1; 1)g: We will choose the
order of agents 1 < 2 suggested by this inclusion (again, this remark about inclusion and
its construction generalizes to all such preference proles). Observe that given such order of
agents, L(R1; z)  L(Rh; y) for any h; h > 1; and therefore sequential inclusion holds.
Notice that the prole we have used in our example showing that a separable domain
may admit strategy-proof rules that are not group strategy-proof does not satisfy our new
requirement. For instance, given that (1,0) is best for agent 1, and that (0,1) is best for
agent 2, (1,1) should be better than (0,0) for both.
3.2 Some special cases
As a corollary of Theorem 1, we obtain some implications of our equivalence result related
with the set of alternatives and with the set of admissible preferences, respectively.
The number of alternatives
We rst show that when there are at most three alternatives at stake, any preference prole
RN 2 i2NRi satises sequential inclusion and moreover, individual and group strategy-
proofness are equivalent.
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Proposition 3 Let #A  3: Then, any prole of preferences RN 2 i2NRi satises se-
quential inclusion and any strategy-proof social choice function on i2NRi is also group
strategy-proof.6
Proof. If #A = 2 or #A = 1 sequential inclusion trivially holds. Therefore, we concentrate
on the case where A consists of three distinct alternatives x, y, and z and RN 2 i2NRi.
Without loss of generality, choose two of these three alternatives, say y and z. Dene
the following partition: S(RN ; y; z) = Sz(RN ; y; z) [ Sfx;zg(RN ; y; z) where Sz(RN ; y; z) =
fj 2 S(RN ; y; z) such that L(Rj; z) = fzgg and Sfx;zg(RN ; y; z) = fk 2 S(RN ; y; z) such
that L(Rk; z) = fx; zgg, respectively. Since their lower contour set at z coincide, for any
j; l 2 Sz(RN ; y; z), j  (RN ; y; z)l. Similarly, for any k; h 2 Sfx;zg(RN ; y; z), k  (RN ; y; z)h.
Moreover, for any j 2 Sz(RN ; y; z), fzg = L(Rj; z)  L(Rk; y) for any k 2 Sfx;zg(RN ; y; z),
thus j % (RN ; y; z)k. Thus, % (RN ; y; z) is complete and acyclic showing that sequential
inclusion holds.
Finally, by Theorem 1, any strategy-proof social choice function on a domain satisfying
sequential inclusion is also group strategy-proof.
The size of admissible sets of preferences
Concerning the set of admissible preferences, observe that if there only exists one agent
whose domain of preferences has cardinality greater than one then strategy-proofness and
group strategy-proofness are obviously the same. Notice that as a consequence of this ob-
servation and the statement in Proposition 3, in order to have non equivalence between
individual and group strategy-proofness, there must be at least four alternatives to choose
from and two agents with #Ri  2.
In Example 3 we illustrate the simplest case where there exist social choice functions that
are individual strategy-proof but not group strategy-proof.
Example 3 Let N = f1; 2g, A = fx; y; z; wg; and Ri = fRi; R0ig for any i 2 N such that
xPiyPizPiw and wP 0iyP
0
izP
0
ix.
Ri R
0
i
x w
y y
z z
w x
Let f and fM be the social choice function described by the following tables:
f R2 R
0
2
R1 x z
R01 y w
,
fM R2 R
0
2
R1 x x
R01 x w
where fM is the majority rule between x and w choosing x when any tie-break is required.
6The same proof works to show that any strategy-proof social choice function with #Af  3 is group
strategy-proof.
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Note that f is strategy-proof but it is not group strategy-proof (in particular f is not e¢ cient).
However, observe that there also exist non-constant rules (fM) that are both strategy-proof
and group strategy-proof.
4 Indirect sequential inclusion
4.1 The condition and its implications
In this section we provide a new condition, weaker than sequential inclusion, that still guar-
antees the equivalence between individual and group strategy-proofness. It is no longer a
condition on individual proles. Rather, it requires that, given a prole within the domain,
some other prole, conveniently related to the rst one (see below), does indeed satisfy our
previous requirement. That is why we say that proles that meet our new condition satisfy
indirect sequential inclusion. The new denition allows us to incorporate new and interesting
domains into our list of those guaranteeing equivalence.
One of them is the universal domain. Since we know from the Gibbard-Satterthwaite
theorem that in that case the only strategy-proof rules are the dictatorial ones, which are also
obviously group strategy-proof, it is nice to have this clear case of equivalence incorporated
into our framework. Moreover, as we shall see, there are also other relevant domains where
sequential inclusion holds indirectly, while not in its original form. Why dont we emphasize
the new condition, which is weaker and satises the same purpose, rather than its direct
version? Essentially, we want to keep both on the same foot, because each one has its own
attractive features. Indirect sequential inclusion is indeed weaker but it is a condition on
domains taken as a whole. Therefore, it may fail if some preferences in a domain are removed
from it. Sequential inclusion is also a domain restriction, but it relies on the properties of
each prole. Therefore, it has the very nice feature of holding for all non-trivial subdomains
of domains satisfying it. Indirect sequential inclusion does not meet this requirement.
Denition 8 For preferences Ri,R0i 2 Ri and alternative z 2 A, R0i is a strict monotonic
transformation of Ri at z if R0i is such that for all x 2 Anfzg such that zRix, zP 0ix.
Denition 9 Let R0N ; RN 2 i2NRi be two preference proles and let z 2 A. We say that
R0N is a strict monotonic transformation of RN at alternative z if for any i 2 N , either
R0i = Ri or else R
0
i is a strict monotonic transformation of Ri at z:
Denition 10 A domain i2NRi satises indirect sequential inclusion if, for all proles
RN 2 i2NRi; either (a) the prole RN satises sequential inclusion; or else (b) for each
pair y; z 2 A there exists R0N 2 i2NRi where R0NnS(RN ;y;z) = RNnS(RN ;y;z); such that
(1) R0N is a strict monotonic transformation of RN at z,
(2) for any i 2 S(RN ; y; z), yP 0iz and
(3) % (R0N ; y; z) is complete and acyclic.
Theorem 2 Let i2NRi be a domain satisfying indirect sequential inclusion. Then, any
strategy-proof social choice function on i2NRi is group strategy-proof.
See the proof of Theorem 2 in the Appendix.
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4.2 Examples: three domains satisfying indirect but not direct
sequential inclusion
The Universal domain
Consider the universal domain: for any agent i 2 N , Ri = R.
First, we show that the universal domain violates sequential inclusion. To do that, we
will show the existence of a preference prole RN and a pair of alternatives y, z, for which
sequential inclusion does not hold. Let R;R0 2 R such that wPyPzPx and xP 0yP 0zP 0w;
respectively.7 Let RN be such that for any i 6= n, Ri = R and Rn = R0: Then, S(RN ; y; z) =
N: Observe that : L(R1; z)  L(Rn; y) and : L(Rn; z)  L(R1; y) hold, which means
that the binary relation % (RN ; y; z) is not complete. Thus, RN does not satisfy sequential
inclusion for y; z.
Now, we show that the universal domain satises indirect sequential inclusion. Let RN
be a preference prole and let y; z 2 A. If % (RN ; y; z) is complete and acyclic, let R0N =
RN : Otherwise, dene R0N as follows: for any j 2 NnS(RN ; y; z), R0j = Rj: And for any
i 2 S(RN ; y; z), R0i and Ri coincide in the ranking of most pairs of alternatives, with two
exceptions. One is that yP 0i t for any t 2 Anfyg (that is, y is pushed up to be the unique
best alternative for R0i). The other change from Ri to R
0
i is that for any t 2 A such that tIiz;
then zP 0i t (that is, alternatives indi¤erent to z in Ri are strictly worse than z under R
0
i).
Observe that R0N satises the following: for any i 2 S(RN ; y; z), R0N is a strict monotonic
transformation of RN at z: Also, for any agent i 2 S(RN ; y; z) the ranking between y and
z has not changed going from Ri to R0i: And nally, % (R0N ; y; z) is complete and acyclic:
Observe that L(R0l; z)  L(R0i; y) = Anfyg for any i; l 2 S(RN ; y; z): Thus, i  (RN ; y; z)l
for any i; l 2 S(RN ; y; z): This shows that the universal domain satises indirect sequential
inclusion.
Mixed single-peaked / single-dipped domains
There are frameworks where the combination of single-peaked and single-dipped preferences,
relative to the same linear order of alternatives >, makes sense. In particular, suppose that
there is a non-empty set of agents in N; say NS , with all single-peaked preferences relative
to > as admissible set. And the complementary set, say ND = NnNS ; the set of agents with
all single-dipped preferences relative to > as admissible set.8 It is worth mentioning that for
such domain of preferences, there exist non-dictatorial strategy-proof rules. Furthermore,
this domain violates sequential inclusion.9
We can construct R0N similarly to the case of the universal domain, to show that the
domain of mixed single-peaked / single-dipped preferences satises indirect sequential inclu-
sion. Let RN be a preference prole and let y; z 2 A. If % (RN ; y; z) is complete and
7Note that by Theorem 1 and Proposition 3, the interesting cases are those where there exist at least
four alternatives.
8This is a domain that has been recently considered by Thomson (2008). Note that any subdomain where
agents in ND have as set of admissible preferences a proper subset of single-dipped ones, would also satisfy
indirect sequential inclusion.
9Consider Example 3 and take the preference prole RN = (R1; R02). Note that R1 is single-peaked and
R02 is single-dipped relative to the order y < x < z < w. RN violates sequential inclusion for y; z. This
argument can be easily generalized for any A.
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acyclic, let R0N = RN (note that if either S(RN ; y; z)  NS or S(RN ; y; z)  ND this
will hold). Otherwise, dene R0N as follows: for any i 2 NnS(RN ; y; z), R0i = Ri; for any
i 2 S(RN ; y; z) \ ND, R0i = Ri, and for any i 2 S(RN ; y; z) \ NS , R0i is a single-peaked
preference which is a monotonic transformation of Ri at z with pi(A) = y. Note that R0i
exists since agents have all single-peaked preferences available. Observe that R0N is a strict
monotonic transformation of RN at z and for any agent i 2 S(RN ; y; z) the ranking be-
tween y and z has not changed going from Ri to R0i: Moreover, % (R0N ; y; z) is complete
and acyclic, where S(R0N ; y; z) = S(RN ; y; z) by construction of R
0
N . To see that R
0
N sat-
ises sequential inclusion for y; z, observe rst that L(R0i; z)  L(R0j; y) = Anfyg for any
i 2 S(R0N ; y; z) and j 2 S(R0N ; y; z)\NS : Thus, i % (R0N ; y; z)j for any i 2 S(R0N ; y; z)\ND
and j 2 S(R0N ; y; z)\NS and l  (R0N ; y; z)j for any l; j 2 S(R0N ; y; z)\NS : Using the same
argument as in the proof of Proposition 2 we can also show that % (R0N ; y; z) is complete and
acyclic over any pair of agents in S(R0N ; y; z)\ND. Thus, the domain of mixed single-peaked
/ single-dipped preferences satises indirect sequential inclusion.
Separable lexicographic preferences with a common ordering of di-
mensions
The domain where all agents have separable and lexicographic preferences relative to a
common order of dimensions satises indirect sequential inclusion, though not sequential
inclusion when k  3.10
We provide an argument for the case k = 3 (this can be generalized for any k > 3) showing
that preference proles on this domain do satisfy indirect sequential inclusion. In Subsection
3.1 we have already shown that for k = 2 such preference proles satisfy sequential inclusion.
Let the number of components be k = 3, and x the order 1<2<3 on all dimensions.
Note that the domain of all individual preferences L1<2<33 is the following:
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8
(0; 0; 0) (1; 0; 0) (0;1;0) (1; 1; 0) (0; 0; 1) (1; 0; 1) (0; 1; 1) (1; 1; 1)
(0; 0; 1) (1; 0; 1) (0;1;1) (1; 1; 1) (0; 0; 0) (1; 0; 0) (0; 1; 0) (1; 1; 0)
(0;1;0) (1; 1; 0) (0; 0; 0) (1; 0; 0) (0; 1; 1) (1; 1; 1) (0; 0; 1) (1; 0; 1)
(0;1;1) (1; 1; 1) (0; 0; 1) (1; 0; 1) (0; 1; 0) (1; 1; 0) (0; 0; 0) (1; 0; 0)
(1; 0; 0) (0; 0; 0) (1; 1; 0) (0;1;0) (1; 0; 1) (0; 0; 1) (1; 1; 1) (0; 1; 1)
(1; 0; 1) (0; 0; 1) (1; 1; 1) (0;1;1) (1; 0; 0) (0; 0; 0) (1; 1; 0) (0; 1; 0)
(1; 1; 0) (0;1;0) (1; 0; 0) (0; 0; 0) (1; 1; 1) (0; 1; 1) (1; 0; 1) (0; 0; 1)
(1; 1; 1) (0;1;1) (1; 0; 1) (0; 0; 1) (1; 1; 0) (0; 1; 0) (1; 0; 0) (0; 0; 0)
Observe that for any pair of alternatives y; z there only exist four preferences in L1<2<33
such that yPz: Thus, for any preference prole RN , S(RN ; y; z) will always consist of, at
most, four types of agents. Consider the following example where y = (0; 1; 0); z = (0; 1; 1);
and suppose that RN is such that agentspreferences are of four di¤erent types: say agents
1, 2, 3, and 4, with R1 = R1; R2 = R2; R3 = R3; and R4 = R4.11 Without loss of generality,
10Note that the set of all separable preferences does not satisfy indirect sequential inclusion.
11A similar argument would work for cases where not all types of agents coexist.
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suppose that there is one agent of each type, that is, S(RN ; y; z) = f1; 2; 3; 4g: Remark that
this prole does not satisfy sequential inclusion, % (RN ; y; z) is not complete since neither
L(R1; z)  L(R4; y) nor L(R4; z)  L(R1; y) hold. However, dene R01 = R3 and R0j = Rj
for any j 6= 1. Clearly, R0N is a strict monotonic transformation of RN at z and for any
i 2 S(RN ; y; z), yP 0iz (in fact, S(R0N ; y; z) = S(RN ; y; z)). Moreover, R0N satises sequential
inclusion for y; z. To see that, observe that L(R02; z)  L(R04; z)  L(R03; z) = L(R01; z):
Thus, according to the binary relation % (R0N ; y; z) on S(R0N ; y; z) we obtain that 2 % 3; 4; 1;
4 % 3; 1; and 3  1. Thus, % (R0N ; y; z) is complete and acyclic. Thus, the domain where all
agents have separable and lexicographic preferences relative to a common order of dimensions
satises indirect sequential inclusion.12
5 Immunity to manipulation by groups that are not
too large
By requiring group strategy-proofness we avoid manipulations by means of coalitions of
any size. However, we could be interested in a strategic concept avoiding manipulations
by coalitions of particular sizes. Specically, we could weaken the requirement of group
strategy-proofness by just imposing that we want to avoid manipulations of coalitions of size
less or equal than k; for a xed k < n; that is, imposing "k-group strategy-proofness".
In this section we dene a property that is weaker than sequential inclusion, and we show
that it is a su¢ cient condition on domains of preferences that guarantee the equivalence
between strategy-proofness and "k-group strategy-proofness".
First, we formally dene k-group strategy-proofness.13 From now on, let k 2 Z such that
k < n:
Denition 11 A social choice function f is k-group strategy-proof on i2NRi if for any
RN 2 i2NRi, there is no coalition C  N with #C  k that manipulates f on i2NRi at
RN .
Note that if f is k-group strategy-proof then f is also l-group strategy-proof for l < k:
The converse is not true (see Example 4 below). When k = 2, we use the terms pairwise
strategy-proofness and 2-size strategy-proofness indistinctly.
Now, we dene k-size sequential inclusion, a weaker version of sequential inclusion.
Denition 12 A preference prole RN 2 i2NRi satises the k-size sequential inclusion
condition if for any pair y; z 2 A; % (RN ; y; z) on S(RN ; y; z) is complete and there is no
cycle of l agents, for any l  k: A domain i2NRi satises k-size sequential inclusion if any
preference prole RN 2 i2NRi satises k-size sequential inclusion.
12Another example: Consider a framework where each agent has separable and lexicographic preferences
relative to one of two xed orders of dimensions. Each one of such preference proles satises the indirect
sequential inclusion (we leave the proof to the reader). Thus, all strategy-proof rules in this new framework
are also group strategy-proof.
13This generalizes Serizawas (2006) concept of "e¤ectively pairwise strategy-proofness". His concept
requires that not only agents, but also pairs of agents should not be able to manipulate. In our case, we
require that no group of size less than k can do it.
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Note that if a preference prole RN satises k-size sequential inclusion it also satises
the l-size version, where l  k. Notice that if a preference prole satises 2-size sequential
inclusion, this means that for any pair y; z 2 A; % (RN ; y; z) on S(RN ; y; z) is complete. If a
preference prole satises k-size sequential inclusion, for k > 2, this means that for any pair
y; z 2 A; % (RN ; y; z) on S(RN ; y; z) is not only complete but also that there are no cycles
of any number of agents lower or equal than k.
In the following result we show that if the k version of sequential inclusion holds then
strategy-proofness implies k-group strategy-proofness.
Theorem 3 Let i2NRi be a domain satisfying the k-size sequential inclusion condition.
Then, any strategy-proof social choice function on i2NRi is k-group strategy-proof.
The proof of this fact is parallel to that of Theorem 1, and is left to the reader.
The following example illustrates the nature of the result in Theorem 3. We exhibit a
domain where pairwise sequential inclusion holds, but 3-size sequential inclusion fails. We
then exhibit a strategy proof social choice function that is also pairwise strategy-proof on
that domain, but fails to satisfy full group strategy-proofness.
Example 4 Let N = f1; 2; 3g and A = fy; z; a; b; cg: Suppose that Ri = fR1i ; R2i ; R3i g for
each agent i 2 N and is given by:
R1i R
2
i R
3
i
a1 a2 a3
y y y
a2 a3 a1
z z z
a3 a1 a2
It is easy to see that i2NRi satises pairwise sequential inclusion. To see a violation
of 3-size sequential inclusion, consider the following prole RN = (R11; R
2
2; R
3
3) and the
pair of alternatives y, z. Note that S(RN ; y; z) = f1; 2; 3g: Since L(R11; z)  L(R22; y) but
:[L(R22; z)  L(R11; y)] then 1  2. Since L(R22; z)  L(R33; y) but :[L(R33; z)  L(R22; y)]
then 2  3. Since L(R33; z)  L(R11; y) but :[L(R11; z)  L(R33; y)] then 3  1. Therefore,
1  2  3 and 3  1: there is a cycle involving three agents and thus RN violates 3-size
sequential inclusion implying that i2NRi violates(3-size) sequential inclusion.14
Dene a social choice function f as follows:
R13
R12 R
2
2 R
3
2
R11 a1 a1 a1
R21 a1 a2 z
R31 a1 a1 a1
R23
R12 R
2
2 R
3
2
R11 a1 a2 a3
R21 a2 a2 a3
R31 y a2 a3
R33
R12 R
2
2 R
3
2
R11 a1 y a3
R21 y a2 a3
R31 a3 a3 a3
14The way to construct this example is the following: there is a pair of alternatives y; z that are the second
best and second worst alternatives, respectively in all individual preferences. Moreover, we need additional
k alternatives, each one being the best for some individual preference and the worst for some other. The
other k   2 alternatives are worse than y and better than z.
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We can check that f is pairwise strategy-proof (thus, strategy-proof) but not group strategy-
proof. To see the latter, consider the prole RN = (R21; R
3
2; R
1
3) and R
0
N = (R
3
1; R
1
2; R
2
3).
Observe that f(RN) = z while f(R0N) = y: Since y is strictly preferred to z by all agents, the
whole coalition manipulates f at RN via R0N .
6 Controlling for the alternatives in the range
In this section we provide a result that could be used by a designer to eventually decide
whether or not to limit the range of a social choice function, as a method to enhance some
of the good properties of a mechanism. In our case, limiting the range could help avoiding
manipulation by groups, but the type of analysis we suggest here might be applicable for
other purposes as well.
When there are only two social alternatives to choose from, it is possible to design non-
dictatorial and (group) strategy-proof social choice functions on the universal domain of all
possible preference proles. The same is also true if society faces more alternatives, but
the range of the social choice function is restricted to only contain two of them. Of course,
articially restricting the range, so that it does not contain all conceivable alternatives, may
have some negative consequences, especially in terms of e¢ ciency. But it may also have the
advantage of limiting the strategic behavior of agents. Therefore, it is useful, in this and
other contexts, to study the trade-o¤s that a designer may face when deciding whether or
not to allow all alternatives to be in the range of a social choice function.
The literature has seldom mentioned the possibility of imposing limits to the range as
part of a deliberate action of design (except, of course, that it has spent much e¤ort to study
the case where there are only two possible social choices). Our specic results suggest that
we may gain by paying attention to such possibility.
Our next result suggests possible limitations of the range as a tool to strengthen the
resilience of functions to be manipulated by large groups. It extends the remark we already
made in Section 3, that with three alternatives all strategy-proof rules are also group strategy-
proof. This time what will matter is no longer the number of alternatives that may be chosen,
but their specic names. The idea is that, if our condition of sequential inclusion holds for
a given subset of alternatives, then the range independent functions dened on this subset
will satisfy our equivalence result.
Denition 13 Given a preference prole RN 2 i2NRi and a pair of alternatives y; z 2 B;
we dene a binary relation % (RN ; y; z) on S(RN ; y; z) as follows:
i % (RN ; y; z)j if L(Ri; z) \B  L(Rj; y) \B.
Denition 14 A prole of preferences RN 2 i2NRi satises sequential inclusion on B  A
if for any y; z 2 B the binary relation % (RN ; y; z) on S(RN ; y; z) is complete and acyclic.
A domain i2NRi satises sequential inclusion on B if the condition holds for all proles
in it.
Proposition 4 Let i2NRi be a domain of preferences satisfying sequential inclusion on
B  A. Then, any strategy-proof social choice function with range B is also group strategy-
proof.
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The proof of Proposition 4 follows the same lines of the proof of Theorem 1, where we
need to replace any expression of lower contour sets L(; ) by L(; ) \ Af .
To conclude this section, notice that we could have complicated the equivalence result
in Proposition 4 by combining the requirement that the condition holds on a subset of
alternatives and for a subgroup of agents (as in Section 5), and obtaining a result on k group
strategy-proofness for restricted ranges.
7 A partial result on necessity
In this section we provide a result that establishes the partial necessity of sequential inclusion
to guarantee that individual and group strategy-proofness become equivalent. We have
already remarked that, if sequential inclusion holds in some domain, it also holds in all
subdomains, and so does equivalence. What we can prove is that if equivalence holds for a
domain and all of its subdomains, then sequential inclusion must be satised by all of them.
Or, equivalently, that if sequential inclusion fails for some domain, then it is possible to nd
a subdomain where to dene a rule that is individually but not group strategy proof. Since
this rule will be dened on a subdomain, rather than on the full domain we start with, we do
not have a full proof of necessity. But we are close, and our decision to stop here is mostly
technical. Since our proof is constructive, it becomes rather involved even if we choose to
work on a very small subdomain where the equivalence fails. In particular, we must choose
the subdomain in question carefully enough to prove that individually strategy-proof rules
are well-dened on it.15 In this section, we concentrate on domains that allow for opposite
preferences. That is, on domains i2NRi such that for any i; if Ri 2 Ri, its opposite Ri also
belongs to Ri (Ri and Ri are opposite if for any x; y 2 A, xRiy , yRix).16
We rst state the basic theorem.
Theorem 4 Let i2NRi be a domain that allows for opposite preferences and such that
any strategy-proof social choice function on i2NDi  i2NRi is also group strategy-proof.
Then, i2NRi satises sequential inclusion.
In fact, we can state the result in more generality, in the spirit of Section 5.
Theorem 5 Let 2  k  n: Let i2NRi be a domain that allows for opposite preferences
and such that any strategy-proof social choice function on i2NDi  i2NRi is also k-group
strategy-proof. Then, i2NRi satises k-size sequential inclusion.
The proof of Theorem 4 is long and quite involved. We sketch it here and we provide all
the remaining details in the Appendix. The proof of Theorem 5 is left to the reader as it
follows exactly the same lines.17
15Existence may be an issue for small domains, where even the dictatorial rule may not be well-dened.
16Notice that all the domains we have discussed in this paper (single-peaked, single-dipped, separable, etc)
admit opposite preferences.
17In fact, we do prove the k = 2 version of Theorem 5 as part of the proof of Theorem 4 (see Appendix,
Lemma 3).
19
Sketch of the proof of Theorem 4.
Our starting point is given by a domain of preferences containing some prole where se-
quential inclusion is violated. We rst use this prole in order to identify a specic set of
alternatives and a specic set of preferences on these alternatives that belong to the domain
and satisfy a number of properties (Lemmas 1 and 2). We use these preferences to create a
subdomain of the original one, and then exploit their characteristics in order to construct a
specic rule that is strategy-proof but not group strategy-proof, within the subdomain. In
the case where sequential inclusion is violated by lack of completeness Lemma 3 provides
a simple construction. When the violation is due to a cycle our choice of domain is more
involved and the rule is more complex. It is essentially a modication of the Borda rule with
two extra features: ties are always avoided and the rule does not follow Borda in two crucial
proles. This rule turns out to be individually but not group strategy-proof on our domain
and this completes the proof.
8 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have identied conditions on domains where all rules satisfying strategy-
proofness must also be immune to manipulations by groups. We have not imposed any further
conditions on the nature and properties of such rules. One could think of further renements
of our results, where the equivalence between individual and group strategy-proofness might
hold (in given domains) between classes of rules which satisfy some additional condition.
As an example, consider social choice functions dened on classical exchange economies,
with the natural domain restrictions implied by the fact that agentspreferences are selsh,
strictly convex and continuous. In this scenario, Barberà and Jackson (1995) establishes the
equivalence between individual and group strategy-proofness for those rules satisfying the
added condition of non-bossyness.
This example also allows us to comment on the type of domain restrictions we may be
interested in. Those that we have used as examples arise very naturally in voting contexts.
But there are also other domains that allow for non-trivial strategy-proof rules and that
appear in connection with economic problems like those of matching, cost allocation, or the
assignment of indivisibles. We conjecture that one would also be able to prove interesting
equivalence results within these domains, especially if concentrating in subclasses of functions
satisfying appropriate additional conditions.
Finally, we also notice that our sequential inclusion condition can be factored out into
two pieces. One requires that the binary relation in our condition is complete; the other
demands its acyclicity. Because of that, in the presence of domain restrictions arising from
other considerations, we may not need to impose the full form of sequential inclusion in
order to get equivalence. For example, we know that in cartesian domains where preferences
satisfy single-crossing, the rst half of our condition will be su¢ cient.
In summary, our work has studied the pure case of equivalence without further restric-
tions. What we suggest is that imposing added structure on domains and/or the functions
dened upon them is a natural next step.
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9 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 2. We begin the proof by stating and proving an auxiliary Lemma and
a Remark.
Lemma Let f be a strategy-proof social choice function. For any RN 2 i2NRi, any
i 2 N , if R0i 2 Ri is a strict monotonic transformation of Ri at f(RN) we have that
f(RN) = f(R
0
i; R i).
Proof of the Lemma Let f be any strategy-proof social choice function. Let RN 2 i2NRi
and let R0i 2 Ri be a strict monotonic transformation of Ri at f(RN). Suppose that
f(RN) 6= f(R0i; R i). By strategy-proofness, f(RN)Rif(R0i; R i) and f(R0i; R i)R0if(RN)
for all R i 2 R i. Since R0i is a strict monotonic transformation of Ri at f(RN), we have
that f(RN)P 0if(R
0
i; R i); a contradiction. This ends the proof of the Lemma.
Remark Notice that condition (b) in Denition 10 can be restated as follows: (b) for
each pair y; z 2 A and for each subset T in S(RN ; y; z); there exists R0N 2 i2NRi where
R0NnT = RNnT ; such that
(1) R0N is a strict monotonic transformation of RN at z,
(2) for any i 2 T , yP 0iz and
(3) % (R0N ; y; z) is complete and acyclic on T .
Proof of the Remark Clearly condition (b) implies condition (b). Now, consider RN 2
i2NRi and let y; z; and R0N such that (b) holds. Let T  S(RN ; y; z) and dene R
0
N such
that R
0
NnT = RNnT and R
0
T = R
0
T . Note that (1), (2), and (3) hold for R
0
N on T since (1),
(2), and (3) hold for R0N on the larger set S(RN ; y; z). This ends the proof of the Remark.
We now complete the proof of Theorem 2.
Let f be a strategy-proof social choice function on i2NRi and by contradiction suppose
that f is manipulable by some coalition C  N; that is, there exists eRC 2 i2CRi, such that
for any agent i 2 C, f( eRC ; R C)Pif(RN). Let us denote y = f( eRC ; R C) and z = f(RN).
Note that C  S(RN ; y; z). The proof consists of c steps. Mainly, in each one, we change
the preference of a single agent i 2 C to be eRi.
Step 1:
Case 1.1 . If RN satises sequential inclusion. We get a contradiction using the same argu-
ment as in the proof of Theorem 1.
Case 1.2 . If RN does not satisfy sequential inclusion, since the domain satises indi-
rect sequential inclusion, by the above Remark applied to y; z and T = C; there exists
R0N such that R
0
NnC = RNnC and conditions (1), (2), and (3) in the above Remark
hold. By the above Lemma and (1), we obtain that f(R0C ; R C) = z: By condition (2),
y = f( eRC ; R C)P 0if(R0C ; R C) = z: Thus, C manipulates f at (R0C ; R C) via eRC . By (3),
% (R0N ; y; z) is complete and acyclic on C. Note that S((R0C ; R C); y; z) = S(RN ; y; z).
Choose an agent in C(C;% (R0N ; y; z)), without loss of generality, say agent 1. Then,
L(R01; z)  L(R0h; y) for any h 2 Cnf1g. Change preferences of agent 1 and let z2 =
f( eR1; R0Cnf1g; R C). By strategy-proofness, z2 2 L(R01; z) and thus z2 2 L(R0h; y) for any
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h 2 Cnf1g: Moreover, observe that S(( eR1; R0Cnf1g; R C); y; z2)  Cnf1g. Go to Step 2.
Step 2: Redene RN  ( eR1; R0Cnf1g; R C):
Case 2.1 . If RN satises sequential inclusion we get a contradiction using the same argu-
ment as in the proof of Theorem 1 changing preferences of all agents except 1 going from
RN  ( eR1; R0Cnf1g; R C) to ( eRC ; R C) and obtaining a contradiction that C manipulates f
at (R0C ; R C) via eRC .
Case 2.2 . If RN does not satisfy sequential inclusion, since the domain satises indirect
sequential inclusion, by the above Remark applied to y; z2 and T = Cnf1g  S(RN ; y; z2) =
S(( eR1; R0Cnf1g; R C); y; z2); there existsR0N such thatR0Nn[Cnf1g] = RNn[Cnf1g] (that is, R0f1g[NnC =
( eR1; RNnC)) such that conditions (1), (2), and (3) in the above Remark hold. By the
above Lemma and (1), we obtain that f(R0Cnf1g; Rf1g[NnC) = z2: By condition (2), y =
f( eRC ; R C)P 0if(R0Cnf1g; Rf1g[NnC) = z2: Thus, Cnf1g manipulates f at (R0Cnf1g; Rf1g[NnC) =
( eR1; R0Cnf1g; R C) via eRCnf1g. By (3), % (R0N ; y; z2) is complete and acyclic on Cnf1g.
Choose an agent in C(Cnf1g;% (R0N ; y; z2)), without loss of generality, say agent 2. Then,
L(R02; z2)  L(R0h; y) for any h 2 Cnf1; 2g. Change preferences of agent 2 and let z3 =
f( eRf1;2g; R0Cnf1;2g; R C). By strategy-proofness, z3 2 L(R02; z2): Thus z3 2 L(R0h; y) for any
h 2 Cnf1; 2g: Also note that S(( eRf1;2g; R0Cnf1;2g; R C); y; z3)  Cnf1; 2g. Go to Step 3.
Step 3: Redene RN  ( eRf1;2g; R0Cnf1;2g; R C):
Case 3.1 . If RN satises sequential inclusion we get a contradiction using the same argument
as in the proof of Theorem 1 applied to Cnf1g changing preferences of all agents except 2
going from RN  ( eRf1;2g; R0Cnf1;2g; R C) to ( eRC ; R C) and obtaining a contradiction that
Cnf1g manipulates f at ( eR1; R0Cnf1g; R C) via eRCnf1g.
Case 3.2 . If RN does not satisfy sequential inclusion, since the domain satises indirect se-
quential inclusion, by the above Remark applied to y; z3 and T = Cnf1; 2g  S(RN ; y; z3) =
S(( eRf1;2g; R0Cnf1;2g; R C); y; z3); there exists R0N such that R0Nn[Cnf1;2g] = RNn[Cnf1;2g] (that
is, R0f1;2g[NnC = ( eRf1;2g; RNnC)) such that conditions (1), (2), and (3) in the above Re-
mark hold. By the above Lemma and (1), we obtain that f(R0Cnf1;2g; Rf1;2g[NnC) = z3:
By condition (2), for i 2 Cnf1; 2g, y = f( eRC ; R C)P 0if(R0Cnf1;2g; Rf1;2g[NnC) = z3: Thus,
Cnf1; 2g manipulates f at (R0Cnf1;2g; Rf1;2g[NnC) = ( eRf1;2g; R0Cnf1;2g; R C) via eRCnf1;2g. By
(3), % (R0N ; y; z3) is complete and acyclic on Cnf1; 2g. Choose an agent in C(Cnf1; 2g;%
(R0N ; y; z3)), without loss of generality, say agent 3. Then, L(R
0
3; z3)  L(R0h; y) for any
h 2 Cnf1; 2; 3g. Change preferences of agent 3 and let z4 = f( eRf1;2;3g; R0Cnf1;2;3g; R C). By
strategy-proofness, z4 2 L(R03; z3): Thus z4 2 L(R0h; y) for any h 2 Cnf1; 2; 3g: Also note
that S(( eRf1;2;3g; R0Cnf1;2;3g; R C); y; z4)  Cnf1; 2; 3g. Go to Step 4.
We repeat a similar argument till Step (c   1). Note that by the recursive argument when
analyzing Step (c   1), from Step (c   2) we know that: Cnf1; :::; c   3g manipulate f at
( eRf1;:::;c 3g; R0Cnf1;:::;c 3g; R C) via eRCnf1;:::;c 3g: Let zc 1 = f( eRf1;:::;c 2g; R0Cnf1;:::;c 2g; R C).By
strategy-proofness, zc 1 2 L(R0c 2; zc 2): Thus zc 1 2 L(R0h; y) for any agent in fc   1; cg:
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Moreover, S(( eRf1;:::;c 2g; R0Cnf1;:::;c 2g; R C); y; zc 1)  fc  1; cg.
Step (c-1): Redene RN  ( eRf1;:::;c 2g; R0Cnf1;:::;c 2g; R C):
Case (c-1).1 . If RN satises sequential inclusion we get a contradiction using the same ar-
gument as in the proof of Theorem 1 applied to Cnf1; :::; c   3g changing only preferences
of agents c  1 and c going from RN  ( eRf1;:::;c 2g; R0fc 1;cg; R C) to ( eRC ; R C) and obtain-
ing a contradiction that Cnf1; :::; c   3g manipulate f at ( eRf1;:::;c 3g; R0Cnf1;:::;c 3g; R C) viaeRCnf1;:::;c 3g:
Case (c-1).2 . If RN does not satisfy sequential inclusion, since the domain satises in-
direct sequential inclusion, by the above Remark applied to y; zc 1 and T = fc   1; cg 
S(RN ; y; zc 1) = S(( eRf1;:::;c 2g; R0Cnf1;:::;c 2g; R C); y; zc 1); there existsR0N such thatR0Nnfc 1;cg =
RNnfc 1;cg such that conditions (1), (2), and (3) in the above Remark hold. By the above
Lemma and (1), we obtain that f(R0fc 1;cg; RNnfc 1;cg) = zc 1: By condition (2), for c   1
and c; y = f( eRC ; R C)P 0if(R0fc 1;cg; RNnfc 1;cg) = zc 1: Thus, fc   1; cg manipulates f at
(R0fc 1;cg; RNnfc 1;cg) = ( eRf1;:::;c 2g; R0fc 1;cg; R C) via eRfc 1;cg. By (3), % (R0N ; y; zc 1) is
complete and acyclic on fc   1; cg. Choose an agent in C(fc   1; cg;% (R0N ; y; zc 1)),
without loss of generality, say agent c   1. Then, L(R0c 1; zc 1)  L(R0h; y) for h = c.
Change preferences of agent c 1 and let zc = f( eRf1;:::;c 1g; R0c; R C). By strategy-proofness,
zc 2 L(R0c 1; zc 1): Thus zc 2 L(R0c; y); which implies that L(R0c; zc)  L(R0c; y): Go to Step
c.
Step c: Let zc+1 = f( eRC ; R C) (that is, zc+1 = y). By strategy-proofness and denition of
zc; zc+1 2 L(R0c; zc). Thus zc+1 = y 2 L(R0c; y) which is the desired contradiction. This ends
the proof of Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 4. Our strategy of proof is as follows. Let i2NRi be a domain where
sequential inclusion is violated. We shall construct a subdomain and exhibit a rule on it
which is strategy-proof but not group strategy-proof.
We will structure our argument as follows. We rst present three lemmas, and then provide
our construction as a nal step.
We begin by Lemma 1. Remember that sequential inclusion requires our binary relation %
to be complete and acyclic for all pairs of alternatives y; z. Therefore, its violation can come
from two sources. If % is incomplete on a pair y; z, then it is easy to show that there are four
distinct alternatives and two preference relations in the domain satisfying enough properties
to allow for our construction. The starting point for this reasoning is the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 Let RN 2 i2NRi and y; z 2 A. If % (RN ; y; z) on S(RN ; y; z) is not complete
then there exist at least four alternatives in A, say y, z, a1, and a2: Moreover, there exist
2 individual preference relations in RN , say R1, R2 such that a1R1y, yP 1z, zR1a2, and
a2R
2y, yP 2z, zR2a1.
Proof of Lemma 1 For completeness to fail, there must exist two alternatives y and z
and two individuals i and j such that :[L(Ri; z)  L(Rj; y)] and :[L(Rj; z)  L(Ri; y)]
hold. There will also be a1; a2 2 Anfy; zg such that a2 2 L(Ri; z) but a2 =2 L(Rj; y) and
a1 2 L(Rj; z) but a1 =2 L(Ri; y) (note that a1 6= z since z 2 L(Ri; y) but a1 =2 L(Ri; y):
23
Similarly, a1 6= y since a1 2 L(Rj; z) but y =2 L(Rj; z)). Finally, observe that a1 6= a2:
since a1 2 L(Rj; z) and yPjz then a1 2 L(Rj; y): But, a2 =2 L(Rj; y). We have then shown
that the violation of completeness requires at least four distinct alternatives. Furthermore,
observe that the preferences of the two agents i and j satisfy the conditions predicated by
the lemma. Then, dene R1 = Ri and R2 = Rj: This ends the proof of Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 identies the alternatives and the preferences on them that will help us determine
a subdomain where equivalence will not hold, given that % is not acyclic. This construction
of such a subdomain and of a function that is strategy-proof on it, but group manipulable
(in fact, by only two-agent coalitions) is the essence of the proof of Lemma 3.
We now turn to the case where % is complete for all pairs and all proles, and the violation
of sequential inclusion arises because it is cyclical for some prole and some pair. We
concentrate on one cycle of minimal length k; and prove that its existence requires that
a number of distinct preferences on at least k + 2 distinct alternatives exist in the initial
domain. We shall use these preferences to construct a subdomain and to dene a social
choice function on it that is strategy-proof but not group strategy-proof. The starting point
for the construction is provided by Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 Let RN 2 i2NRi and y; z 2 A such that % (RN ; y; z) on S(RN ; y; z) has a
cycle of size k, 3  k  s but % (RN ; y; z) does not have any cycle of lower size. Then,
there exist at least k + 2 alternatives in A; say y, z, a1, a2,...,ak 2 A. There also exist k
individual preference relations in RN , say R1, R2, ..., Rk; such that for any l = 1; :::; k 2 N ,
the following holds: [(1) alRly, (2) zRlal 1, for any j = 1; :::; k   2; (3) yP lal+j; and
(4) al+jP lz]. Moreover, if for any alternative w 2 A, the binary relation % (RN ; y; w) on
S(RN ; y; w) is complete, then (5) for any l = 1; :::; k, [al+jP lal+1+j, for j = 1; :::k   3].18
Again, Lemma 2 allows us to identify alternatives and specic preferences that will be used
to construct a subdomain where to dene a function that proves the lack of equivalence.
Before turning to the proof we introduce a piece of notation and we present an example of
the type of reasoning that we shall be using.
Concerning notation, we dene the following equivalence relation on the set of integers. Let
k 2 Z (Z is the set of integers), k  n, and i; j 2 Z we say that j and i are equivalent
modulo k, say j  i (mod k), if either j = i or else j = i+ vk, for some v 2 Z.
In what follows, whenever we have j  i (mod k), then we will write Rj = Ri. We will do
the same and Rj = Ri, when we refer to a list of specic preference relations labelled by
their superindex, or aj = ai, where these are the subindices in a list of alternatives.
Now, Example 5 shows how, given a prole that generates a cycle in our binary relation %,
this allows us to single out some set of preferences that will later be used to construct the
domain we are looking for. The argument in the proof of Lemma 2 extends the intuition in
this example.
Example 5 Take N = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g and A = fa1; a2; a3; a4; a5; y; zg. Let RN 2 i2NRi
such that % (RN ; y; z) on S(RN ; y; z) has a cycle of size four, but none of lower size. Note
that this means that #S(RN ; y; z)  4:We single out four preference relations in RN and six
18The latter condition has some bite only for k  4:
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alternatives in A in such a way that those preferences, when restricted to the six alternatives,
are as follows:
R1 R2 R3 R4
a1 a2 a3 a4
y y y y
a2 a3 a4 a1
a3 a4 a1 a2
z z z z
a4 a1 a2 a3
:
Note that we do not say anything about the relative position of a5 with respect to any other
alternative: it could be any. Observe that the relation % (RN ; y; z) over agents having the
preferences in the table has a cycle of size four, is complete and has no cycle of size 3. In
particular, observe that the following binary relations hold: 1  2, 2  3, 3  4 and 4  1.
Moreover, 1  3, 2  4:
Proof of Lemma 2 We rst prove that there must exist alternatives and individuals whose
preferences satisfy (1) and (2). Without loss of generality, let the cycle of k agents be
1  2  3  :::  k and k  1. Thus, their individual preferences in RN ; say R1, R2, ..., Rk;
are such that L(Rl; z)  L(Rl+1; y) and :

L(Rl+1; z)  L(Rl; y)

for l = 1; :::; k: From the
latter expression, for any l = 1; :::; k, there exists al 2 Anfz; yg such that zRl+1al and alRly.
Note that for any l = 1; :::; k, al 6= z and al 6= y since yPlz and yPl+1z, respectively. Thus,
there exist k individual preference relations in RN , in particular: R1, R2, ..., Rk; such that
expressions (1) and (2) in the lemma hold. We now show that the alternatives al so dened
are all distinct.
For any i, 1  i  k   1, [ai 6= aj, for any j, k  j > i].
Let i; j such that j   i = 1. Given the above cycle of k agents, j  j + 1, thus aj 1 2
L(Rj; z)  L(Rjy). But we also proved that aj =2 L(Rj; y). Thus, aj 6= aj 1:
Let i; j such that j   i = 2. Given the above cycle of k agents, j   1  j, thus aj 2 2
L(Rj 1; z)  L(Rj; y). But since j  j + 1, by aj =2 L(Rj; y). Thus, aj 6= aj 1:
Let i; j such that j   i = t, for 3  t  k   1. By assumption, there is no cycle of agents in
S(RN ; y; z) of size t: Thus, given the above cycle of k agents, i+1  i+2  :::  i+(t 1)  j
and i + 1 % j: Thus, ai 2 L(Ri+1; z)  L(Rj; y). But we also proved that aj =2 L(Rj; y).
Thus, ai 6= aj.
We now prove that the preferences in question satisfy expression (3).
For any l = 1; :::; k, [al+jPlz for any j = 1; :::; k   2].
Take any j: By assumption, there is no cycle of agents in S(RN ; y; z) of size j + 1 (since
2  j+1  k 1): Thus, given the above dened cycle of k agents, l  l+1  :::  l+ j  j
and l % l + j: Thus, L(Rl; z)  L(Rl+j; y). If zRlal+j then al+j 2 L(Rl+j; y) which contra-
dicts expression (1) above proved.
We now show that the preferences also satisfy expression (4).
For any l = 1; :::; k, [yPlal+j for any j = 1; :::; k   2].
Take any j: By assumption, there is no cycle of agents in S(RN ; y; z) of size k   j (since
2  k   j  k   1): Thus, given the above dened cycle of k agents l   (k   j   1) 
l   (k   j)  l   (k   j + 1)  :::  l   3  l   2  l   1  l and l   (k   j   1) % l:
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Using our equivalence, l+ j + 1  l+ j + 1  k (mod k) and thus Rl+j+1 = Rl+j+1 k. Thus,
L(Rl+j+1; z)  L(Rl; y). By the previous lemma, we know that al+j 2 L(Rl+j+1; z); and thus
al+j 2 L(Rl; y).
For k = 3 the Lemma is proved.
For k  4, we nally prove that the preferences also satisfy expression (5).
For any l = 1; :::; k, [al+jPlal+1+j, for j = 1; :::; k   3].
We rst show that for any l = 1; :::; k, al+1Plal+1+j for j = 1; :::; k   3. (*)
Fix l and j. By contradiction, suppose that al+1+jRlal+1. Consider the pair of alternatives
(y; al+1+j). By hypothesis, the binary relation % (RN ; y; al+1+j) on S(RN ; y; al+1+j) is com-
plete. Since l; l+1 2 S(RN ; y; al+1+j), either l % l+1 or l+1 % l should hold. By hypothesis,
al+1 2 L(Rl; al+1+j) and, by conditions (1) to (4) already proved, al+1 =2 L(Rl+1; y). Then,
: L(Rl; al+1+j)  L(Rl+1; y), or equivalently, : [l % l + 1]. On the other hand, by condi-
tions (1) to (4), al =2 L(Rl; y); but also al 2 L(Rl+1; z) and al+1+jPl+1z holds. The latter
two expressions imply that al 2 L(Rl+1; al+1+j). Then, :

L(Rl+1; al+1+j)  L(Rl; y)

, or
equivalently, : [l + 1 % l] which is the desired contradiction.
For k = 4 the Lemma is proved.
Now, for k > 4, we show that for any l = 1; :::; k, al+tPlal+t+1 for any t, t = 2; :::; k   3:
Fix l and t. By contradiction, suppose that al+t+1Rlal+t. Consider the pair of alterna-
tives (y; al+t+1). By hypothesis, the binary relation % (RN ; y; al+t+1) on S(RN ; y; al+t+1)
is complete. Since l; l + t 2 S(RN ; y; al+t+1), either l % l + t or l + t % l should hold.
By hypothesis, al+t 2 L(Rl; al+t+1) and, by conditions (1) to (4), al+t =2 L(Rl+t; y). Then,
: L(Rl; al+t+1)  L(Rl+t; y), or equivalently, : [l % l + t]. On the other hand, by conditions
(1) to (4), al =2 L(Rl; y): Using the modulo k equivalence, and by the previous statement
(*) applied for j = k   1   t and for l  l + t, al+t+1Pl+tal (that is, al 2 L(Rl+t; al+t+1)).
Then, : L(Rl+t; al+t+1)  L(Rl; y), or equivalently, : [l + t % l] which is the desired con-
tradiction.
Observe that the preferences of the k agents, 1; :::; k, satisfy the conditions predicated by
the lemma. Again dene Ri = Ri for all i = 1; :::; k: This ends the proof of Lemma 2.
Next we prove a Lemma that is, in fact, the k = 2 version of our Theorem 5. This Lemma
already establishes our result for the case where sequential inclusion is violated by the lack
of completeness of our binary relation.19
Lemma 3 Let i2NRi be a domain on which any strategy-proof social choice function on
i2NDi  i2NRi is also pairwise strategy-proof on i2NDi: Then, i2NRi satises 2-size
sequential inclusion.
Proof of Lemma 3 Suppose that i2NRi violates 2-size sequential inclusion. Then, there
existsRN 2 i2NRi, a pair of alternatives y; z 2 A; such that the binary relation% (RN ; y; z)
dened on S(RN ; y; z) is not complete.
Therefore there exists a pair of agents i; j 2 S(RN ; y; z) such that neither i % j nor j % i.
19This is the rst instance where we use the assumption that the domain admits opposite preferences.
Lemmas 1 and 2 do not require it and could therefore be used to explore similar partial necessity results on
domains satisfying alternative requirements.
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By Lemma 1 we know that there exist a1; a2 2 Anfy; zg and a1 6= a2; and there exists two
individual preference relations in RN , say R1; R2 such that a1R1y, yP 1z, zR1a2, and a2R2y,
yP 2z, zR2a1. Dene Di = fR1; R1g; Dj = fR2; R2g for i; j, Dl = Rl for any l 2 Nnfi; jg:
Note that R
1
and R
2
are the opposite preferences of R1 and R2, respectively. Now construct
f as follows: for any bR fi;jg l2Nnfi;jg Rl; f(R1i ; R2j ; bR fi;jg) = a1, f(R1i ; R2j ; bR fi;jg) = a2,
f(R1i ; R
2
j ;
bR fi;jg) = z, f(R1i ; R2j ; bR fi;jg) = y. Note that f is strategy-proof but not pairwise
strategy-proof. This ends the proof of Lemma 3.
A nal step: identifying a domain and dening a rule
Suppose, without loss of generality, that i2NRi is a domain such that for any RN 2 i2NRi
and any pair of alternatives y; z 2 A, % (RN ; y; z) on S(RN ; y; z) is complete but sequential
inclusion does not hold. Then, there exists eRN 2 i2NRi, a pair of alternatives y; z 2 A;
such that % ( eRN ; y; z) dened on S( eRN ; y; z) = fi 2 N : y ePizg has cycles. Let k  3 be the
minimal size of these cycles. Therefore there exists a set of k agents, say Sk = f1; 2; :::; kg
included in S( eRN ; y; z) such that 1  2  :::  k and k  1. Thus, there exist at least
k + 2 alternatives, say y, z, a1, a2,...,ak 2 A, and k individual preference relations in eRN ,
say R1,..., Rk; satisfying conditions (1) to (5) in Lemma 2.
We now identify a subdomain and a rule on it that is strategy-proof but not group strategy-
proof.20
Each individual will have two possible preferences. Then, out of all possible proles we will
single out two of them: the one where each agent i has preferences Ri, and the one where
each agent i has opposite preferences R
i
. All other proles will be classied in a way that
depends on the sets of agents that have preferences of one type and of the other. Formally,
consider the following subdomain of i2NRi. For any l 2 Nnf1; :::; kg; dene Dl = Rl: For
any i = 1; :::; k, dene Di = fRi; Rig where Ri is the opposite preference of Ri. Clearly,
i2NDi  i2NRi: Let eRSk = (R1,..., Rk) and call RSk = (R1,..., Rk).
Let RSk 2 i2SkDi. We dene a partition of Sk that depends on RSk : Let Sk;z(RSk) = fi 2
Sk : Ri 6= Rig and Sk;y(RSk) = fj 2 Sk : Rj = Rjg.
Now construct f as follows: for any bR Sk 2 l2NnSkDl,
f(R11; :::; R
k
k; bR Sk) = f( eRSk ; bR Sk) = z;
f(R1+t1 ; :::; R
k+t
k ;
bR Sk) = f(RSk ; bR Sk) = y, and
f(RSk ;
bR Sk) = arg max
al2fa1;:::;akg
Borda"((RSk ;
bR Sk); al), for any other RSk 2 i2SkDi,
where Borda"((RSk ; bR Sk); al) Pj2Sk;y(RSk )Borda"(Rj; al), with Borda"(Rj; al) the score
that alternative al receives under individual preference Rj for j 2 Sk;y(RSk) as given in the
20In particular this rule happens to be not only strategy-proof but also (k-1)-group strategy-proof. This
follows from the fact that our subdomain satises (k-1)-size sequential inclusion.
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following table
ainRj R1 R2 R3 ::: Rk 2 Rk 1 Rk
Borda"(Rj; a1) k   1 + " 0 1 k   4 k   3 k   2 + "
Borda"(Rj; a2) k   2 + " k   1 + " 0 k   5 k   4 k   3 + "
Borda"(Rj; a3) k   3 + " k   2 + " k   1 + " k   6 k   5 k   4 + "
:
Borda"(Rj; ak 2) 2 + " 3 + " 4 + " k   1 + " 0 1 + "
Borda"(Rj; ak 1) 1 + " 2 + " 3 + " k   2 + " k   1 + " 0
Borda"(Rj; ak) 0 1 2 k   3 k   2 k   1 + "
and with " > 0 and "< 1
k 2 .
Notice rst that only agents in Sk;y play an e¤ective role in the social choice function. The rest
are dummies. Next, we should explain what we mean by the expression above: Borda"().
What we do is to compute a variant of the Borda count for all those proles that are di¤erent
from the two we singled out to produce z and y, respectively. In this version of the Borda
count, each alternative receives the points that correspond to it because of its position,
plus eventually some value ". The alternatives and positions that get this extra epsilon are
chosen in such a way that no ties arise among winners within the domain. Therefore, we are
dening a function, not a correspondence. The specic values that apply under this rule for
our proles are given in the above table.
Note that for any bR Sk 2 l2NnSkRl and any i 2 f1; :::; kg, f( bRSk ; bR Sk) = ai, wherebRSk 2 l2SkDlnf eRSk ; RSkg is such that Sk;y( bRSk) = fig. Thus, the range of the social choice
function is Af = fa1; :::; ak; y; zg:
We now show the following two claims for any RSk 2 l2SkDlnf eRSk ; RSkg, and bR Sk 2
l2NnSkRl. Note that Sk;z(RSk) and Sk;y(RSk) are non-empty sets. In words, Claim 1
requires that at least one agent belonging to the set Sk;y; of agents i with preference Ri, has
no incentive to deviate to alternative y. Claim 2 requires that at least one agent belonging
to the set Sk;z; of agents i with preference Ri0, has no incentive to deviate from alternative
z.
Claim 1 Let RSk 2 l2SkDlnf eRSk ; RSkg and bR Sk 2 l2NnSkRl. Then,
f(RSk ;
bR Sk) 2 [
j2Sk;y(RSk )
U(Rj; y);
where U(Rj; y) = fx 2 A : xRjyg.
Proof of Claim 1 By contradiction, suppose that, without loss of generality, f(RSk ; bR Sk) =
ai such that yPjai for all j 2 Sk;y(RSk). Thus, i =2 Sk;y(RSk): Therefore,X
j2Sk;y(RSk )
Borda"
 
Rj; a(i 1)modk

>
X
j2Sk;y(RSk )
Borda"(Rj; ai),
and thus f(RSk ; bR Sk) 6= ai which is the desired contradiction. This ends the proof of Claim
1.
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Claim 2 Let RSk 2 l2SkDlnf eRSk ; RSkg and bR Sk 2 l2NnSkRl. Then,
f(RSk ;
bR Sk) 2 [
i2Sk;z(RSk )
L(Ri; z):
Proof of Claim 2 By contradiction, suppose that, without loss of generality, f(RSk ; bR Sk) =
al such that al =2
[
i2Sk;z(RSk )
L(Ri; z). Therefore, (l + 1) mod k 2 Sk;y(RSk). For notational
simplicity, we will write (l + 1) instead. By Claim 1, l 2 Sk;y(RSk). Note that for any
l = 1; :::; k;
Borda"(Rl+1; al+1) Borda"(Rl+1; al) = k   1+":
Since Sk;z(RSk) is not empty, if l 6= k   1 we haveX
j2Sk;y(RSk )nfl+1g
Borda"(Rj; al) 
X
j2Sk;y(RSk )nfl+1g
Borda"(Rj; al+1) < k   1:
Then,
Borda"

(RSk ;
bR Sk); al+1 Borda" (RSk ; bR Sk); al>k   1 + "+ 1  k = " > 0,
and thus f(RSk ; bR Sk) 6= al which is the desired contradiction.
If l = k   1 and since Sk;z(RSk) is not empty,X
j2Sk;y(RSk )nfkg
Borda"(Rj; ak 1) 
X
j2Sk;y(RSk )nfkg
Borda"(Rj; ak)  (k   2)(1 + "):
Therefore,
Borda"

(RSk ;
bR Sk); ak Borda" (RSk ; bR Sk); ak 1 1  (k   3)"
where 1  (k   3)" > 0 since " < 1
k 2 . Thus f(RSk ;
bR Sk) 6= al = ak 1 which is the desired
contradiction. This ends the proof of Claim 2.
We now show that f is strategy-proof but it is not k-group strategy-proof. Observe that
by construction of f , the only relevant deviating coalitions are those C  Sk. Since
each agent in coalition Sk strictly gains by deviating from f(R11; R
2
2; :::; R
k
k; ;
bR Sk) = z to
f(R
1
1; R
2
2; :::; R
k
k;
bR Sk) = y, then f is not k-group strategy-proof.
We now check that no single individual l 2 Sk can manipulate f at any prole. Let
(RSk ;
bR Sk) 2 i2NDi be any prole. Remember that for any l 2 Sk, Dl = fRl; Rlg.
We distinguish two cases:
Case 1 If l 2 Sk;y(RSk). By denition of f , f(RSk ; bR Sk) 6= y. Suppose that f(RSk ; bR Sk) =
ai for some i 2 Sk and thus Sk;y(RSk) $ Sknflg. If agent l announces R
l
l instead of R
l
l, in
the denition of f agent l deducts more score to those alternatives he likes most. Therefore
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either the initial alternative ai or else a less preferred alternative for agent l is chosen and
agent l does not manipulate f at (RSk ; bR Sk) via Rl. An identical argument would apply if
f(RSk ;
bR Sk) = z instead of ai. This shows that no agent l 2 Sk;y(RSk) can manipulate f at
any prole (RSk ; bR Sk) via Rll.
Case 2 If l 2 Sk;z(RSk). A similar argument to Case 1 works: By denition of f ,
f(RSk ;
bR Sk) 6= z. Suppose that f(RSk ; bR Sk) = ai for some i 2 Sk and thus Sk;y(RSk) 
Sknflg. If agent l announces Rll instead of R
l
l, in the denition of f agent l adds more score
to those alternatives he likes less (when announcing Rll agent l 2 Sk;y((Rll; RSknflg; bR Sk).
Therefore either the initial alternative ai or else a less preferred alternative for agent l is
chosen and agent l does not manipulate f at (RSk ; bR Sk) via Rl. An identical argument
would apply if f(RSk ; bR Sk) = y instead of ai. This shows that no agent l 2 Sk;y(RSk) can
manipulate f at any prole (RSk ; bR Sk) via Rll.
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